1 00:00:02,235 --> 00:00:03,703 I was afraid. 2 00:00:03,770 --> 00:00:04,971 I didn't know where I was. 3 00:00:05,038 --> 00:00:08,141 NARRATOR: Lost and disoriented, the strange crowd 4 00:00:08,208 --> 00:00:10,910 makes its way through a wooded suburb. 5 00:00:10,977 --> 00:00:13,446 Just minutes ago, they were aboard a flight 6 00:00:13,513 --> 00:00:14,881 bound for Portland, Oregon. 7 00:00:14,948 --> 00:00:16,750 All of a sudden, there was a big crash. 8 00:00:16,816 --> 00:00:18,251 The next thing I knew I was standing outside. 9 00:00:18,318 --> 00:00:19,919 I don't know how the hell I got there. 10 00:00:19,986 --> 00:00:21,221 A man with a flashlight-- 11 00:00:21,287 --> 00:00:22,622 Excuse me. 12 00:00:22,689 --> 00:00:24,090 Came down the aisle. 13 00:00:24,157 --> 00:00:27,260 They continued circling for about an hour. 14 00:00:27,327 --> 00:00:30,730 Was it a crew problem, or was it an aircraft problem? 15 00:00:30,797 --> 00:00:31,931 NARRATOR: The voice recorder-- 16 00:00:31,998 --> 00:00:33,333 OK, let's go. 17 00:00:33,400 --> 00:00:34,901 Could provide the answer. 18 00:00:34,968 --> 00:00:38,071 Reset that circuit breaker momentarily. 19 00:00:38,138 --> 00:00:41,374 I was very interested in how a highly experienced captain 20 00:00:41,441 --> 00:00:44,144 could fly around in sight of the airport in good weather 21 00:00:44,210 --> 00:00:46,780 and not put this airplane on the ground safely. 22 00:00:46,846 --> 00:00:49,449 OK, declare a mayday. 23 00:00:49,516 --> 00:00:52,018 Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our approach. 24 00:00:52,085 --> 00:00:53,119 We lost both engines. 25 00:00:53,186 --> 00:00:54,287 Put the mask over your nose. 26 00:00:54,354 --> 00:00:55,288 Emergency descent. 27 00:00:55,355 --> 00:00:56,289 Mayday, mayday. 28 00:00:56,356 --> 00:00:57,524 Brace for impact! 29 00:00:57,590 --> 00:00:59,492 Here's the last one. 30 00:00:59,559 --> 00:01:01,961 Investigation starting. 31 00:01:02,028 --> 00:01:08,735 It's gonna crash! 32 00:01:14,874 --> 00:01:18,344 NARRATOR: December 28, 1978-- 33 00:01:18,411 --> 00:01:20,814 We're losing an engine. 34 00:01:20,880 --> 00:01:26,119 United Airlines flight 173 is less than 22 miles 35 00:01:26,186 --> 00:01:28,154 from Portland International Airport. 36 00:01:28,221 --> 00:01:29,355 It's flamed out. 37 00:01:29,422 --> 00:01:30,523 Why? 38 00:01:30,590 --> 00:01:33,893 You can fly a DC 8 or any transport airplane 39 00:01:33,960 --> 00:01:36,196 with one engine inoperative. 40 00:01:36,262 --> 00:01:38,598 NARRATOR: John Cox as a commercial pilot 41 00:01:38,665 --> 00:01:40,567 an aviation expert. 42 00:01:40,633 --> 00:01:42,368 It requires a lot of airmanship. 43 00:01:42,435 --> 00:01:46,239 Pilots train every time they're in a simulator in case 44 00:01:46,306 --> 00:01:48,875 of a loss of an engine. 45 00:01:48,942 --> 00:01:52,812 All right. 46 00:01:52,879 --> 00:01:54,514 The thing to remember is don't worry. 47 00:01:54,581 --> 00:01:58,051 Captain Melbourne McBroom, a veteran of the Second 48 00:01:58,117 --> 00:02:00,320 World War, is one of United Airlines' 49 00:02:00,386 --> 00:02:02,956 most experienced pilots. 50 00:02:03,022 --> 00:02:05,725 His first officer Rod Bibby has more than 5,000 51 00:02:05,792 --> 00:02:08,995 hours flying experience. 52 00:02:09,062 --> 00:02:11,097 The first officer was relatively new 53 00:02:11,164 --> 00:02:12,398 on the airplane. 54 00:02:12,465 --> 00:02:15,635 He had probably been on it six months or maybe less. 55 00:02:15,702 --> 00:02:17,303 He was an experienced pilot, but he'd 56 00:02:17,370 --> 00:02:19,939 been flying other equipment. 57 00:02:20,006 --> 00:02:23,843 NARRATOR: Flight engineer Forrest Mendenhall is 58 00:02:23,910 --> 00:02:24,978 the third member of the crew. 59 00:02:25,044 --> 00:02:26,112 OK. 60 00:02:26,179 --> 00:02:28,581 NARRATOR: It's his job to monitor the DC8's 61 00:02:28,648 --> 00:02:34,988 three remaining engines. 62 00:02:35,054 --> 00:02:36,623 The flight began in New York City 63 00:02:36,689 --> 00:02:39,559 with a stopover in Denver. 64 00:02:39,626 --> 00:02:42,228 It's three days after Christmas. 65 00:02:42,295 --> 00:02:44,797 Many of the 189 people on board are 66 00:02:44,864 --> 00:02:46,900 returning from their holidays. 67 00:02:46,966 --> 00:02:49,936 17-year-old Amy Connor is flying back to boarding 68 00:02:50,003 --> 00:02:52,105 school in Washington State. 69 00:02:52,171 --> 00:02:53,873 I picked up the flight in Denver, 70 00:02:53,940 --> 00:02:56,576 and everything seemed to go normally. 71 00:02:56,643 --> 00:02:57,744 I got to my seat. 72 00:02:57,810 --> 00:03:01,481 I was sitting in between two very nice people. 73 00:03:01,548 --> 00:03:02,482 NARRATOR: In the cockpit-- 74 00:03:02,549 --> 00:03:03,650 All right. 75 00:03:03,716 --> 00:03:05,051 NARRATOR: --the pilots are focused on getting 76 00:03:05,118 --> 00:03:06,452 their plane to the airport. 77 00:03:06,519 --> 00:03:09,589 United 173 would like clearance for an approach 78 00:03:09,656 --> 00:03:12,058 in the 28 Left now. 79 00:03:12,125 --> 00:03:13,960 NARRATOR: Air traffic controller Ed Kingrey 80 00:03:14,027 --> 00:03:17,297 is on duty at Portland Tower. 81 00:03:17,363 --> 00:03:20,733 I was working radar that night down in the radar room. 82 00:03:20,800 --> 00:03:24,337 As I recall, it wasn't all that busy at the time. 83 00:03:24,404 --> 00:03:26,205 United 173, heavy. 84 00:03:26,272 --> 00:03:33,179 OK, roll out heading 010 to runway 28 Left. 85 00:03:33,246 --> 00:03:35,949 NARRATOR: He clears Flight 173 to land on the airport's 86 00:03:36,015 --> 00:03:38,251 longest runway. 87 00:03:38,318 --> 00:03:41,688 He said, we'll-- we'll be heading in for a landing now. 88 00:03:41,754 --> 00:03:44,057 In this case, he was coming from the east, 89 00:03:44,123 --> 00:03:46,159 so he lined him up for a straight in. 90 00:03:47,493 --> 00:03:49,095 You're going to lose number three in a minute, too. 91 00:03:50,396 --> 00:03:51,531 NARRATOR: The plane's engines are 92 00:03:51,598 --> 00:03:54,267 flaming out one after another. 93 00:03:54,334 --> 00:03:58,438 I recall hearing the captain tell the tower 94 00:03:58,504 --> 00:04:01,441 they're losing engines. 95 00:04:01,507 --> 00:04:02,976 NARRATOR: With two engine's gone, 96 00:04:03,042 --> 00:04:05,244 the autopilot can no longer fly the plane. 97 00:04:06,713 --> 00:04:13,319 McBroom must get the crippled DC-8 to the airport himself. 98 00:04:16,189 --> 00:04:17,624 You've got to keep running, Frosty. 99 00:04:17,690 --> 00:04:18,758 Yes, sir. 100 00:04:18,825 --> 00:04:20,193 NARRATOR: The engineer struggles to keep 101 00:04:20,259 --> 00:04:24,664 the last two engines running. 102 00:04:24,731 --> 00:04:27,634 How far do you show us from the field? 103 00:04:27,700 --> 00:04:28,868 I'd call it-- 104 00:04:28,935 --> 00:04:30,737 EDWARD KINGREY: I told him it was 18 flying miles. 105 00:04:30,803 --> 00:04:31,738 --18 flying miles. 106 00:04:31,804 --> 00:04:33,706 Which would include the base leg 107 00:04:33,773 --> 00:04:36,342 to the final and then the turn to final 108 00:04:36,409 --> 00:04:41,080 to the end of the runway. 109 00:04:44,651 --> 00:04:46,719 We just lost one and two. 110 00:04:46,786 --> 00:04:51,090 NARRATOR: Flight 173 has now lost all four engines. 111 00:04:51,157 --> 00:04:53,526 The cabin lights all went out. 112 00:04:53,593 --> 00:04:55,728 That, we all assumed, was an indicator 113 00:04:55,795 --> 00:05:02,568 that something was wrong. 114 00:05:02,635 --> 00:05:04,871 NARRATOR: With no engines running, 115 00:05:04,937 --> 00:05:06,839 back-up batteries now provide power 116 00:05:06,906 --> 00:05:13,579 to only critical instruments. 117 00:05:13,646 --> 00:05:15,481 People started to shout. 118 00:05:15,548 --> 00:05:16,616 MALBURN MCBROOM (OVER PA): Brace! 119 00:05:16,683 --> 00:05:18,151 Brace! - Get your heads down. 120 00:05:18,217 --> 00:05:19,185 Get into your brace positions. 121 00:05:19,252 --> 00:05:20,553 MALBURN MCBROOM (OVER PA): Brace! 122 00:05:20,620 --> 00:05:23,556 NARRATOR: The 100-ton aircraft is losing more than 3,000 123 00:05:23,623 --> 00:05:25,892 feet of altitude a minute. 124 00:05:25,958 --> 00:05:29,962 Total power loss in a DC-8 would be very catastrophic. 125 00:05:30,029 --> 00:05:33,399 NARRATOR: At this rate, they will be lucky to stay airborne 126 00:05:33,466 --> 00:05:39,806 for as long as 90 seconds. 127 00:05:39,872 --> 00:05:44,544 Now Captain McBroom makes a horrifying calculation. 128 00:05:44,610 --> 00:05:45,611 We can't make it. 129 00:05:45,678 --> 00:05:47,947 NARRATOR: The airport is too far away. 130 00:05:48,014 --> 00:05:49,882 We can't make anything. 131 00:05:49,949 --> 00:05:51,818 NARRATOR: The jetliner is dropping fast 132 00:05:51,884 --> 00:05:54,654 over a city of 350,000 people. 133 00:05:54,721 --> 00:05:56,889 McBroom needs to find a safe place 134 00:05:56,956 --> 00:05:59,158 to put the aircraft down and try to save 135 00:05:59,225 --> 00:06:01,561 the lives of all onboard. 136 00:06:01,627 --> 00:06:04,297 To land a transport jet off an airport 137 00:06:04,363 --> 00:06:07,533 is a situation that no pilot wants to face. 138 00:06:07,600 --> 00:06:10,036 Putting it into a populated area 139 00:06:10,103 --> 00:06:12,004 would be an absolute last choice. 140 00:06:12,071 --> 00:06:13,005 OK. 141 00:06:13,072 --> 00:06:15,341 Declare mayday. 142 00:06:15,408 --> 00:06:17,543 Portland Tower, United 173, heavy mayday. 143 00:06:17,610 --> 00:06:19,979 He declared mayday, and then in a very-- 144 00:06:20,046 --> 00:06:21,748 what seemed to me like a-- 145 00:06:21,814 --> 00:06:24,984 a calm, matter-of-fact voice, I could hear the pilot. 146 00:06:25,051 --> 00:06:26,652 Engines are flaming out. We're going down. 147 00:06:26,719 --> 00:06:28,421 We're not going to be able to make it to the airport. 148 00:06:28,488 --> 00:06:29,422 We lost power. 149 00:06:29,489 --> 00:06:30,757 We're going down. 150 00:06:30,823 --> 00:06:33,392 NARRATOR: Emergency services are told what's happening. 151 00:06:33,459 --> 00:06:34,594 Flight 173 is flamed-out. 152 00:06:34,660 --> 00:06:37,396 They're going down. 153 00:06:37,463 --> 00:06:41,801 NARRATOR: Kingrey tries to figure out where they'll hit. 154 00:06:41,868 --> 00:06:44,237 I could see him coming in from the south, his 155 00:06:44,303 --> 00:06:46,072 navigational lights flashing. 156 00:06:46,139 --> 00:06:47,940 I could tell he was quite low. 157 00:06:48,007 --> 00:06:49,308 NARRATOR: The DC-8 is coming down 158 00:06:49,375 --> 00:06:51,677 over a densely-populated suburb. 159 00:06:51,744 --> 00:06:53,412 And I can no longer see him. 160 00:06:53,479 --> 00:06:57,517 I was, of course, expecting the worst. 161 00:06:57,583 --> 00:06:59,519 NARRATOR: Suddenly, Captain McBroom sees 162 00:06:59,585 --> 00:07:03,089 what he's been looking for-- 163 00:07:03,156 --> 00:07:05,158 a dark area up ahead. 164 00:07:05,224 --> 00:07:07,260 It looks like an empty field. 165 00:07:07,326 --> 00:07:09,295 The place that you want to put it is where there-- 166 00:07:09,362 --> 00:07:12,899 there's minimum buildings, the most open area possible 167 00:07:12,965 --> 00:07:19,071 because the 200,000 pounds-plus jet arriving at 140 knots, 168 00:07:19,138 --> 00:07:21,340 which is 160-plus miles an hour-- 169 00:07:21,407 --> 00:07:22,508 it's going to do a lot of damage 170 00:07:22,575 --> 00:07:28,014 to the things on the ground. 171 00:07:28,080 --> 00:07:30,349 NARRATOR: Putting the plane on this narrow strip of land 172 00:07:30,416 --> 00:07:35,555 is McBroom's best bet. 173 00:07:35,621 --> 00:07:38,157 But as he gets closer, he realizes 174 00:07:38,224 --> 00:07:40,927 it isn't an open field. 175 00:07:40,993 --> 00:07:42,161 We can't make it. 176 00:07:42,228 --> 00:07:44,130 NARRATOR: It's a heavily wooded suburb, 177 00:07:44,197 --> 00:07:51,204 and he's headed straight for it. 178 00:07:52,705 --> 00:07:56,209 JOHN COX: If they're woods and that's all you have, 179 00:07:56,275 --> 00:07:57,844 then you're going to have to deal with it. 180 00:07:57,910 --> 00:08:00,079 The tops of trees are pretty soft. 181 00:08:00,146 --> 00:08:01,781 As you settle into the trees, they 182 00:08:01,848 --> 00:08:03,349 get progressively less soft. 183 00:08:03,416 --> 00:08:06,085 They're going to do a lot of damage. 184 00:08:06,152 --> 00:08:07,787 NARRATOR: McBroom doesn't give up. 185 00:08:07,854 --> 00:08:12,992 He actually tries to steer the plane between the trees. 186 00:08:14,427 --> 00:08:16,529 The passengers still assume they're about to touch down 187 00:08:16,596 --> 00:08:17,697 on a runway. 188 00:08:17,763 --> 00:08:19,932 We clipped the top of a few trees, 189 00:08:19,999 --> 00:08:22,401 and that felt like we were making the initial landing 190 00:08:22,468 --> 00:08:23,536 at the airport. 191 00:08:23,603 --> 00:08:27,306 So my first sense was, hooray, we're there. 192 00:08:27,373 --> 00:08:30,376 And then all hell broke loose. 193 00:08:33,679 --> 00:08:35,181 It was this enormous noise. 194 00:08:35,248 --> 00:08:38,184 I can't even begin to describe what kind of noise it is. 195 00:08:38,251 --> 00:08:41,120 It's physical. 196 00:08:41,187 --> 00:08:48,194 You can feel it in your bones. 197 00:08:51,464 --> 00:08:54,734 I saw the bright flash out there and-- 198 00:08:54,800 --> 00:08:56,969 and knew he had gone down. 199 00:09:02,375 --> 00:09:05,144 NARRATOR: The plane carves a 1,600-foot-long 200 00:09:05,211 --> 00:09:11,617 path through the trees. 201 00:09:11,684 --> 00:09:18,357 After the plane stopped moving, it was pretty calm. 202 00:09:18,424 --> 00:09:21,827 There was no fire. 203 00:09:21,894 --> 00:09:26,799 People just wanted to get out and very polite, taking turns. 204 00:09:29,769 --> 00:09:31,370 There was no hurry. 205 00:09:35,308 --> 00:09:37,777 I remember seeing a lot of people 206 00:09:37,843 --> 00:09:42,648 with the same expression of stunned disbelief. 207 00:09:42,715 --> 00:09:43,649 You know, where are we? 208 00:09:43,716 --> 00:09:46,953 And how did we get here? 209 00:09:47,019 --> 00:09:50,456 NARRATOR: Incredibly, the DC-8 has crashed-landed 210 00:09:50,523 --> 00:09:52,959 in the middle of a major American city 211 00:09:53,025 --> 00:09:59,098 without injuring a single person on the ground. 212 00:09:59,165 --> 00:10:01,734 Most of the 189 passengers and crew 213 00:10:01,801 --> 00:10:08,808 are alive, including Captain Malburn McBroom. 214 00:10:10,109 --> 00:10:11,544 The captain flying the airplane-- 215 00:10:11,610 --> 00:10:13,946 he kept it under control, and that's a big, 216 00:10:14,013 --> 00:10:15,915 big, big positive. 217 00:10:15,982 --> 00:10:18,250 NARRATOR: But he can't understand why his plane 218 00:10:18,317 --> 00:10:23,456 lost power and crashed. 219 00:10:23,522 --> 00:10:26,292 I was afraid. 220 00:10:26,359 --> 00:10:27,960 I didn't know where I was. 221 00:10:28,027 --> 00:10:30,730 I was only 17. 222 00:10:30,796 --> 00:10:34,900 I also realized that my parents in Minnesota 223 00:10:34,967 --> 00:10:37,636 needed to hear from me. 224 00:10:37,703 --> 00:10:38,637 I walked into this home. 225 00:10:38,704 --> 00:10:39,739 Hello? 226 00:10:39,805 --> 00:10:41,273 And I said, I need to use your telephone. 227 00:10:41,340 --> 00:10:42,942 I need to use your telephone. 228 00:10:43,009 --> 00:10:46,912 My parents' initial reaction was to listen 229 00:10:46,979 --> 00:10:48,681 and kind of blow me off. 230 00:10:48,748 --> 00:10:52,284 I was a teenage drama queen, and 17-year-olds 231 00:10:52,351 --> 00:10:54,020 do tend to exaggerate. 232 00:10:54,086 --> 00:10:57,757 But a few minutes later, they got the news they broke 233 00:10:57,823 --> 00:11:00,860 into their television program. 234 00:11:00,926 --> 00:11:02,328 REPORTER: The plane crashed 5 miles 235 00:11:02,395 --> 00:11:04,730 southeast of the airport in a residential area. 236 00:11:04,797 --> 00:11:07,767 Two homes were hit, one disintegrated. 237 00:11:07,833 --> 00:11:09,602 Rescue workers worked through the night. 238 00:11:09,668 --> 00:11:11,303 They carefully picked through the wreckage, 239 00:11:11,370 --> 00:11:12,671 looking for bodies. 240 00:11:12,738 --> 00:11:15,107 They won't know the exact number of dead until 241 00:11:15,174 --> 00:11:16,509 sometime today. 242 00:11:16,575 --> 00:11:19,412 The news teams found us before the emergency 243 00:11:19,478 --> 00:11:22,048 crews did, and so there were cameras, there was lights. 244 00:11:22,114 --> 00:11:23,949 The next thing I know it was boom, boom real hard, 245 00:11:24,016 --> 00:11:24,950 and we were shaking. 246 00:11:25,017 --> 00:11:26,519 And we were down in the position. 247 00:11:26,585 --> 00:11:29,121 All of a sudden, there was a big-- you know, a big crash. 248 00:11:29,188 --> 00:11:31,123 One thump I remember, and then the next thing 249 00:11:31,190 --> 00:11:32,258 I knew I was standing outside. 250 00:11:32,324 --> 00:11:33,526 I don't know how the hell I got there. 251 00:11:35,261 --> 00:11:38,130 NARRATOR: Confronted by such an unprecedented disaster, 252 00:11:38,197 --> 00:11:41,867 the entire airline industry needs an answer. 253 00:11:41,934 --> 00:11:45,905 How could a DC-8 crash 6 miles short of the airport 254 00:11:45,971 --> 00:11:54,513 on a calm, clear night? 255 00:11:57,583 --> 00:12:01,387 The morning after the crash of United Airlines Flight 173. 256 00:12:01,454 --> 00:12:05,357 NTSB investigators are on the scene. 257 00:12:05,424 --> 00:12:07,560 One of the members of the team is human factor 258 00:12:07,626 --> 00:12:11,097 specialist Alan Diehl. 259 00:12:11,163 --> 00:12:13,566 We needed to get out and document the wreckage, 260 00:12:13,632 --> 00:12:16,102 take photographs, take measurements, and so on, very 261 00:12:16,168 --> 00:12:21,006 critical that you do that. 262 00:12:21,073 --> 00:12:23,542 NARRATOR: It's apparent to Diehl 263 00:12:23,609 --> 00:12:26,645 that this disaster could have been much worse. 264 00:12:26,712 --> 00:12:28,848 How the hell did they miss those? 265 00:12:28,914 --> 00:12:30,316 NARRATOR: Captain McBroom somehow 266 00:12:30,382 --> 00:12:33,686 managed to shoehorn the plane into a narrow strip of woods 267 00:12:33,752 --> 00:12:36,055 in the middle of Portland. 268 00:12:36,122 --> 00:12:38,958 When I saw how close he'd come to apartment complexes, 269 00:12:39,024 --> 00:12:41,393 I realized this could have been one of the worst 270 00:12:41,460 --> 00:12:44,697 accidents in history. 271 00:12:44,763 --> 00:12:46,866 NARRATOR: The main cabin of Flight 173 272 00:12:46,932 --> 00:12:50,870 has survived the crash largely intact, 273 00:12:50,936 --> 00:12:55,307 but the nose of the plane is completely destroyed. 274 00:12:55,374 --> 00:12:56,942 It looked to me like the front of the airplane 275 00:12:57,009 --> 00:12:59,712 almost opened up like a banana when it plowed 276 00:12:59,778 --> 00:13:04,650 through the woods and couldn't believe that anybody 277 00:13:04,717 --> 00:13:10,689 had survived this. 278 00:13:10,756 --> 00:13:12,992 NARRATOR: Eight passengers and two members of the crew 279 00:13:13,058 --> 00:13:15,528 are dead. 280 00:13:15,594 --> 00:13:18,164 ALAN DIEHL: A flight engineer had died in the crash, as had 281 00:13:18,230 --> 00:13:23,636 the lead flight attendant. 282 00:13:28,073 --> 00:13:29,642 NARRATOR: Investigators hope survivors 283 00:13:29,708 --> 00:13:35,447 can provide some insight into what brought this jet down. 284 00:13:35,514 --> 00:13:37,516 When did you first notice something out of the ordinary? 285 00:13:41,086 --> 00:13:43,923 NARRATOR: They learn that just over an hour before the crash 286 00:13:43,989 --> 00:13:46,559 the passengers heard a terrifying sound. 287 00:13:48,027 --> 00:13:54,033 We heard a loud thud and felt the plane jolt. 288 00:13:54,099 --> 00:13:55,568 The whole plane just shook. 289 00:13:55,634 --> 00:13:58,470 It was-- it was a jarring sensation. 290 00:13:58,537 --> 00:13:59,738 What was that? 291 00:13:59,805 --> 00:14:01,006 AIMEE CONNER: And of course, everybody 292 00:14:01,073 --> 00:14:02,107 wanted to know what it was. 293 00:14:02,174 --> 00:14:03,108 What was that? 294 00:14:03,175 --> 00:14:05,878 Lots of conversation-starters. 295 00:14:05,945 --> 00:14:06,879 What do you think that was? 296 00:14:06,946 --> 00:14:11,550 Lots of guessing. 297 00:14:11,617 --> 00:14:15,821 A man with a flashlight came down the aisle. 298 00:14:15,888 --> 00:14:16,922 NARRATOR: One of the pilots comes 299 00:14:16,989 --> 00:14:20,025 back to the passenger cabin. 300 00:14:20,092 --> 00:14:22,728 At this point, I started realizing something 301 00:14:22,795 --> 00:14:25,030 really was wrong. 302 00:14:25,097 --> 00:14:26,031 Excuse me. 303 00:14:26,098 --> 00:14:28,701 Can I look out the window here? 304 00:14:28,767 --> 00:14:30,836 AIMEE CONNER: That something wasn't working 305 00:14:30,903 --> 00:14:32,271 the way it should be and they weren't 306 00:14:32,338 --> 00:14:34,306 telling us about it yet. 307 00:14:34,373 --> 00:14:35,374 NARRATOR: The pilot is searching 308 00:14:35,441 --> 00:14:37,243 for something in the darkness. 309 00:14:37,309 --> 00:14:42,181 We're all wanting to know what was going on. 310 00:14:42,248 --> 00:14:44,783 Then the captain came on the PA. 311 00:14:44,850 --> 00:14:46,318 MALBURN MCBROOM (ON PA): Ladies and gentlemen, 312 00:14:46,385 --> 00:14:47,853 this is your captain speaking. 313 00:14:47,920 --> 00:14:49,788 The pilot finally got on and said, 314 00:14:49,855 --> 00:14:51,991 we're having trouble with the landing gear. 315 00:14:52,057 --> 00:14:54,860 We're not sure whether or not it's working correctly. 316 00:14:54,927 --> 00:14:57,196 We'll be running a few routine checks. 317 00:14:57,263 --> 00:14:58,931 Captains are always focused on the safety 318 00:14:58,998 --> 00:14:59,932 of the passengers. 319 00:14:59,999 --> 00:15:00,933 It comes with the job. 320 00:15:03,402 --> 00:15:06,505 That is, if the airplane is experiencing an abnormality, 321 00:15:06,572 --> 00:15:09,241 what's the effect on the passengers and crew? 322 00:15:09,308 --> 00:15:10,643 Do we need to descend? 323 00:15:10,709 --> 00:15:12,878 What do we need to do to make sure that everybody 324 00:15:12,945 --> 00:15:15,180 gets through this abnormality with 325 00:15:15,247 --> 00:15:17,650 the minimum negative effects? 326 00:15:17,716 --> 00:15:21,420 How did the cabin crew react? 327 00:15:21,487 --> 00:15:25,557 They told us to prepare for an emergency landing. 328 00:15:25,624 --> 00:15:27,760 NARRATOR: Passengers are told to remove their jewelry 329 00:15:27,826 --> 00:15:30,963 and securely stow any loose items. 330 00:15:31,030 --> 00:15:32,765 It's clear that the captain is concerned 331 00:15:32,831 --> 00:15:36,902 that his landing gear might collapse on touchdown. 332 00:15:36,969 --> 00:15:39,705 But something isn't making sense to Diehl. 333 00:15:39,772 --> 00:15:41,206 ALAN DIEHL: Crash landings on-airport 334 00:15:41,273 --> 00:15:42,908 are eminently survivable. 335 00:15:42,975 --> 00:15:44,376 First of all, you've got all the equipment 336 00:15:44,443 --> 00:15:47,713 to handle the fire, the fire engines and the rescue people. 337 00:15:47,780 --> 00:15:49,214 But if you have to go off-airport, 338 00:15:49,281 --> 00:15:52,017 it's a whole different situation. 339 00:15:52,084 --> 00:15:54,219 How does a landing gear problem bring down a plane? 340 00:15:57,423 --> 00:16:01,427 NARRATOR: At the crash site of United Airlines Flight 173, 341 00:16:01,493 --> 00:16:05,597 investigators retrieve the plane's flight recorders. 342 00:16:05,664 --> 00:16:07,800 One contains flight data. 343 00:16:07,866 --> 00:16:11,070 The other records voices in the cockpit. 344 00:16:11,136 --> 00:16:14,540 ALAN DIEHL: I've always said that the flight data recorder 345 00:16:14,606 --> 00:16:16,542 tells you what happened, but you 346 00:16:16,608 --> 00:16:20,479 have to listen very carefully to the cockpit voice recorder 347 00:16:20,546 --> 00:16:26,285 to understand why things happen the way they did. 348 00:16:26,352 --> 00:16:27,820 NARRATOR: The recorders will be analyzed 349 00:16:27,886 --> 00:16:30,356 at National Transportation Safety Board headquarters 350 00:16:30,422 --> 00:16:37,396 in Washington. 351 00:16:39,264 --> 00:16:41,033 One of the most important witnesses 352 00:16:41,100 --> 00:16:43,569 is Ed Kingrey, the controller who 353 00:16:43,635 --> 00:16:47,072 handled Flight 173's approach. 354 00:16:47,139 --> 00:16:49,875 I cleared him for an approach to runway 28. 355 00:16:49,942 --> 00:16:52,144 I was about to hand him off to the tower controller. 356 00:16:52,211 --> 00:16:55,781 He basically said he'd stay with me, that he was having 357 00:16:55,848 --> 00:16:59,318 some kind of unsafe gear indication 358 00:16:59,385 --> 00:17:03,555 and he didn't know if one of the landing gear were down. 359 00:17:03,622 --> 00:17:04,556 Negative. 360 00:17:04,623 --> 00:17:05,824 We'll stay with you. 361 00:17:05,891 --> 00:17:08,827 When we've got a gear problem we'll let you know. 362 00:17:08,894 --> 00:17:13,432 NARRATOR: Flight 173 did not want to come in to land. 363 00:17:13,499 --> 00:17:17,836 United 173 heavy, turn left, heading 100. 364 00:17:17,903 --> 00:17:23,742 I'll just orbit you out there. 365 00:17:23,809 --> 00:17:25,744 NARRATOR: Kingrey cleared Flight 173 366 00:17:25,811 --> 00:17:28,113 to fly a holding pattern south of the airport 367 00:17:28,180 --> 00:17:31,250 over the Portland suburbs. 368 00:17:31,316 --> 00:17:34,486 Captain McBroom wanted time to troubleshoot the gear problem 369 00:17:34,553 --> 00:17:37,089 and give his flight attendants time to prepare the cabin 370 00:17:37,156 --> 00:17:39,057 for an emergency landing. 371 00:17:39,124 --> 00:17:42,928 If they have opportunity to plan and prepare 372 00:17:42,995 --> 00:17:46,131 people, things such as where the exits are, 373 00:17:46,198 --> 00:17:49,735 the quality and success of the evacuation 374 00:17:49,802 --> 00:17:55,174 goes up dramatically. 375 00:17:55,240 --> 00:17:57,209 A holding pattern would basically 376 00:17:57,276 --> 00:18:00,612 give him his own air space there 377 00:18:00,679 --> 00:18:03,015 to do whatever he had to do. 378 00:18:06,652 --> 00:18:10,155 I didn't hear much from him after that. 379 00:18:10,222 --> 00:18:13,292 NARRATOR: Investigators learn that after they begin circling 380 00:18:13,358 --> 00:18:16,295 Kingrey only speaks to Flight 173 381 00:18:16,361 --> 00:18:20,699 to warn them of other nearby aircraft. 382 00:18:20,766 --> 00:18:24,303 I would give him traffic, and he would acknowledge it. 383 00:18:24,369 --> 00:18:27,339 There's traffic out there about 9:30. 384 00:18:27,406 --> 00:18:29,741 I see somebody out there with a light on. 385 00:18:29,808 --> 00:18:32,411 EDWARD KINGREY: But no indication to me what was 386 00:18:32,478 --> 00:18:33,946 going on inside the cockpit. 387 00:18:36,181 --> 00:18:39,017 NARRATOR: The crew of Flight 173 is given as much time 388 00:18:39,084 --> 00:18:42,120 as it needs in the holding pattern. 389 00:18:42,187 --> 00:18:43,455 EDWARD KINGREY: It's up to the captain 390 00:18:43,522 --> 00:18:47,292 to decide when it's time for them to come in and land. 391 00:18:47,359 --> 00:18:49,895 They continued circling for about an hour. 392 00:18:49,962 --> 00:18:53,398 NARRATOR: Investigators learned Flight 173 circled Portland 393 00:18:53,465 --> 00:18:56,235 for an unusually long time. 394 00:18:58,136 --> 00:19:01,173 There was no indication to me the-- 395 00:19:01,240 --> 00:19:03,976 the gravity of the situation. 396 00:19:04,042 --> 00:19:05,310 NARRATOR: They now wonder what happened 397 00:19:05,377 --> 00:19:07,579 during that hour of circling to turn 398 00:19:07,646 --> 00:19:08,780 a landing gear malfunction-- 399 00:19:09,915 --> 00:19:11,717 We've got a gear problem. 400 00:19:11,783 --> 00:19:13,385 We'll let you know. 401 00:19:13,452 --> 00:19:15,454 NARRATOR: --into catastrophic engine failure. 402 00:19:16,522 --> 00:19:17,456 The engines are flaming out. 403 00:19:17,523 --> 00:19:18,757 We're going down. 404 00:19:18,824 --> 00:19:20,759 We're not going to be able to make it to the airport. 405 00:19:20,826 --> 00:19:24,563 I was clearly very interested in how a highly experienced 406 00:19:24,630 --> 00:19:27,499 captain could fly around for over an hour 407 00:19:27,566 --> 00:19:29,401 inside of the airport in good weather 408 00:19:29,468 --> 00:19:31,737 and not put this airplane on the ground safely. 409 00:19:37,943 --> 00:19:39,545 NARRATOR: Investigators find the plane's 410 00:19:39,611 --> 00:19:46,618 right side landing gear. 411 00:19:48,387 --> 00:19:51,123 A rusted bolt has pulled free of the mechanism that 412 00:19:51,189 --> 00:19:54,059 raises and lowers the gear. 413 00:19:54,126 --> 00:19:55,961 This could explain it. 414 00:19:56,028 --> 00:19:57,229 NARRATOR: The landing gear would have 415 00:19:57,296 --> 00:20:00,999 dropped suddenly into place. 416 00:20:01,066 --> 00:20:02,467 JOHN COX: The free fall of the gear 417 00:20:02,534 --> 00:20:05,971 would be very apparent to everyone on the airplane. 418 00:20:06,038 --> 00:20:07,573 What was that? 419 00:20:07,639 --> 00:20:11,243 JOHN COX: You would get a very large thump or clunking sound. 420 00:20:11,310 --> 00:20:14,079 You'd feel the gear slam up against the lock, 421 00:20:14,146 --> 00:20:16,081 and so you'd get this reverberation 422 00:20:16,148 --> 00:20:18,584 through the airplane. 423 00:20:18,650 --> 00:20:20,485 ALAN DIEHL: And we learn that, due to corrosion, 424 00:20:20,552 --> 00:20:22,688 the extension mechanism had failed, 425 00:20:22,754 --> 00:20:26,158 and that's what caused the gear to slam down. 426 00:20:26,224 --> 00:20:28,460 NARRATOR: The discovery explains the troubling sound-- 427 00:20:30,095 --> 00:20:32,097 --heard in the cabin an hour before the crash. 428 00:20:35,033 --> 00:20:40,138 But it still doesn't explain the massive engine failure. 429 00:20:44,509 --> 00:20:47,512 The NTSB brings another investigator into the Portland 430 00:20:47,579 --> 00:20:50,449 crash, Dennis Grossi. 431 00:20:50,515 --> 00:20:53,952 DENNIS GROSSI: I was assigned to be the aircraft performance 432 00:20:54,019 --> 00:20:56,688 engineer for this accident. 433 00:20:56,755 --> 00:20:58,890 Basically, it's pulling together 434 00:20:58,957 --> 00:21:02,861 all the information that's available to determine 435 00:21:02,928 --> 00:21:05,330 the aircraft's performance. 436 00:21:05,397 --> 00:21:06,765 NARRATOR: If there was a malfunction, 437 00:21:06,832 --> 00:21:10,302 Grossi hopes the Cockpit Voice Recorder or CVR picked 438 00:21:10,369 --> 00:21:12,871 up the pilots discussing it. 439 00:21:12,938 --> 00:21:14,539 OK. Let's go. 440 00:21:14,606 --> 00:21:15,941 NARRATOR: The recording begins 30 441 00:21:16,008 --> 00:21:18,543 minutes before the crash as the pilots circle over Portland. 442 00:21:18,610 --> 00:21:20,312 MALBURN MCBROOM (ON RECORDING): Ladies and gentlemen, 443 00:21:20,379 --> 00:21:23,682 this is your captain speaking. 444 00:21:23,749 --> 00:21:26,151 NARRATOR: In the era of analog recording, 445 00:21:26,218 --> 00:21:29,855 the CVR uses a 30-minute-long loop of magnetic tape 446 00:21:29,921 --> 00:21:35,227 that keeps recording over itself throughout the flight. 447 00:21:35,293 --> 00:21:37,663 Most air disasters unfold in a matter 448 00:21:37,729 --> 00:21:44,736 of minutes or even seconds. 449 00:21:46,538 --> 00:21:49,174 So having the last half hour of cockpit sounds 450 00:21:49,241 --> 00:21:51,510 and conversation should give investigators 451 00:21:51,576 --> 00:21:53,845 enough material to work with. 452 00:21:53,912 --> 00:21:55,881 DENNIS GROSSI: There's four channels, one cockpit area 453 00:21:55,947 --> 00:21:57,983 microphone and then a channel for each 454 00:21:58,050 --> 00:21:59,818 of the three crew members. 455 00:21:59,885 --> 00:22:01,119 FORREST MENDENHALL (ON RECORDING): 456 00:22:01,186 --> 00:22:03,188 --because I only got this thing to shine down there. 457 00:22:03,255 --> 00:22:04,589 NARRATOR: They hear the flight engineer 458 00:22:04,656 --> 00:22:06,258 leave the cockpit to troubleshoot 459 00:22:06,324 --> 00:22:10,562 the landing gear problem. 460 00:22:10,629 --> 00:22:12,464 In the early generation jets, it 461 00:22:12,531 --> 00:22:16,968 was very common to have mechanical indications 462 00:22:17,035 --> 00:22:23,108 that the landing gear was, in fact, down and locked. 463 00:22:23,175 --> 00:22:24,876 NARRATOR: When the landing gear is lowered, 464 00:22:24,943 --> 00:22:27,813 a small rod pops up on the wing, 465 00:22:27,879 --> 00:22:32,784 providing visual confirmation that the gear is in place. 466 00:22:32,851 --> 00:22:34,653 The flight engineer would be asked by the captain 467 00:22:34,720 --> 00:22:37,022 to go back and check the mechanical indicators 468 00:22:37,089 --> 00:22:40,092 for the position of the landing gear, walk down the aisle 469 00:22:40,158 --> 00:22:41,827 to about the center of the wing. 470 00:22:41,893 --> 00:22:42,828 Excuse me. 471 00:22:42,894 --> 00:22:44,062 Can I look out the window here? 472 00:22:44,129 --> 00:22:45,363 JOHN COX: And he could look over, 473 00:22:45,430 --> 00:22:47,999 and there are tabs that actually come up and go down. 474 00:22:48,066 --> 00:22:52,804 And he could see if the gear was extended and locked. 475 00:22:52,871 --> 00:22:54,639 NARRATOR: It's exactly what Aimee Connor 476 00:22:54,706 --> 00:22:56,341 described to investigators-- 477 00:22:56,408 --> 00:22:58,810 A man with a flashlight came through the aisle. 478 00:22:58,877 --> 00:23:03,849 --in her post-crash interview. 479 00:23:03,915 --> 00:23:05,851 How's that main gear back there? 480 00:23:05,917 --> 00:23:07,753 Both appear to be down and locked. 481 00:23:07,819 --> 00:23:09,988 NARRATOR: Despite his engineer's report, 482 00:23:10,055 --> 00:23:13,091 Captain McBroom is still concerned. 483 00:23:13,158 --> 00:23:19,531 If the gear is locked, none of the lights should be flashing. 484 00:23:19,598 --> 00:23:24,102 And the touchdown if that gear folds or something. 485 00:23:24,169 --> 00:23:27,806 Obviously the lights were affected, the electronics that 486 00:23:27,873 --> 00:23:29,941 tell the crew members whether or not the gear is down 487 00:23:30,008 --> 00:23:31,443 and locked. 488 00:23:31,510 --> 00:23:32,878 NARRATOR: Landing gear failure is 489 00:23:32,944 --> 00:23:35,547 rare in commercial aviation. 490 00:23:35,614 --> 00:23:37,916 When it does happen, statistics show that most 491 00:23:37,983 --> 00:23:39,317 passengers survive unscathed. 492 00:23:41,386 --> 00:23:45,323 In 2008, engine failure forced British Airways Flight 493 00:23:45,390 --> 00:23:51,163 38 to make a crash-landing. 494 00:23:51,229 --> 00:23:54,065 The impact ripped the Boeing 777 landing 495 00:23:54,132 --> 00:23:57,302 gear from the fuselage. 496 00:23:57,369 --> 00:24:04,176 The plane was totaled, but no one was killed. 497 00:24:08,246 --> 00:24:11,249 There's one check we missed, checking 498 00:24:11,316 --> 00:24:15,487 the gear warning horn. 499 00:24:15,554 --> 00:24:17,255 - Right. - Correct. 500 00:24:17,322 --> 00:24:18,490 Right. 501 00:24:18,557 --> 00:24:20,959 Normally when we see these problems of a gear light 502 00:24:21,026 --> 00:24:23,695 not coming on, it's a light bulb or some minor piece 503 00:24:23,762 --> 00:24:25,297 of circuitry. 504 00:24:25,363 --> 00:24:27,933 NARRATOR: It appears that a minor electrical problem 505 00:24:27,999 --> 00:24:33,538 had become a major distraction for Captain McBroom. 506 00:24:33,605 --> 00:24:35,240 So how do we do that? 507 00:24:35,307 --> 00:24:36,775 NARRATOR: That still doesn't explain 508 00:24:36,842 --> 00:24:38,844 why the plane lost power. 509 00:24:38,910 --> 00:24:43,882 But what investigators hear next could explain everything. 510 00:24:43,949 --> 00:24:45,450 RODERICK BEEBE (ON RECORDING): Losing an engine. 511 00:24:45,517 --> 00:24:46,651 It's flamed out. 512 00:24:46,718 --> 00:24:48,887 Why? 513 00:24:48,954 --> 00:24:49,888 Fuel. 514 00:24:51,223 --> 00:24:54,125 NARRATOR: First officer Beebe's answer is chilling. 515 00:24:54,192 --> 00:24:56,595 After nearly an hour in a holding pattern, 516 00:24:56,661 --> 00:25:00,432 Flight 173 is simply running out of gas. 517 00:25:00,498 --> 00:25:02,200 RODERICK BEEBE (ON RECORDING): We're losing an engine. 518 00:25:02,267 --> 00:25:05,036 NARRATOR: NTSB investigator Alan Diehl has discovered 519 00:25:05,103 --> 00:25:06,771 something crucial on the CVR. 520 00:25:06,838 --> 00:25:07,772 It's flamed out. 521 00:25:07,839 --> 00:25:09,007 What? 522 00:25:09,074 --> 00:25:11,009 NARRATOR: Less than eight minutes before the DC-8 523 00:25:11,076 --> 00:25:13,678 crashes into a Portland suburb, the captain 524 00:25:13,745 --> 00:25:19,985 seems unconvinced that low fuel is behind his engine failure. 525 00:25:20,051 --> 00:25:22,320 He was asking what was causing that, 526 00:25:22,387 --> 00:25:26,057 and he got a very adamant answer saying "fuel." 527 00:25:26,124 --> 00:25:27,359 Fuel. 528 00:25:27,425 --> 00:25:29,060 As if to say, we've been trying to tell 529 00:25:29,127 --> 00:25:30,295 you about this all along. 530 00:25:31,563 --> 00:25:35,033 Open those crossfeeds there or something. 531 00:25:35,100 --> 00:25:37,535 JOHN COX: There are cross feed valves that are opened 532 00:25:37,602 --> 00:25:40,939 in a specific sequence to let one tank feed 533 00:25:41,006 --> 00:25:44,075 one or more engines, and it's the job of the flight 534 00:25:44,142 --> 00:25:45,877 engineer, in the case of a DC-8, 535 00:25:45,944 --> 00:25:50,048 to know exactly how to do that. 536 00:25:50,115 --> 00:25:51,650 Showing fumes. 537 00:25:51,716 --> 00:25:53,251 NARRATOR: Though the crew couldn't agree on 538 00:25:53,318 --> 00:25:55,320 exactly how much was left-- 539 00:25:55,387 --> 00:25:57,088 No, it's showing 1,000 or better. 540 00:25:57,155 --> 00:25:58,790 I don't think it's in there. 541 00:25:58,857 --> 00:26:00,125 NARRATOR: --one thing is certain-- 542 00:26:00,191 --> 00:26:04,029 there isn't enough to keep the engine's running. 543 00:26:04,095 --> 00:26:07,132 Losing an engine. 544 00:26:07,198 --> 00:26:08,333 It's flamed out. 545 00:26:08,400 --> 00:26:10,802 It takes a few things to make an engine run. 546 00:26:10,869 --> 00:26:13,305 One of them is fuel. 547 00:26:13,371 --> 00:26:15,307 MALBURN MCBROOM (ON RECORDING): You got that crossfeed open? 548 00:26:15,373 --> 00:26:17,008 NARRATOR: Captain McBroom is desperate. 549 00:26:17,075 --> 00:26:19,010 He needs to get more fuel to the remaining engines. 550 00:26:20,078 --> 00:26:21,313 No, I haven't got it open. 551 00:26:21,379 --> 00:26:23,081 Which one? 552 00:26:23,148 --> 00:26:24,082 Open them both. 553 00:26:24,149 --> 00:26:26,251 Damn it, get some fuel in there. 554 00:26:26,318 --> 00:26:28,053 NARRATOR: Each of the plane's four engines 555 00:26:28,119 --> 00:26:29,821 has its own fuel tank. 556 00:26:29,888 --> 00:26:32,490 Opening the crossfeeds should allow fuel to flow 557 00:26:32,557 --> 00:26:36,061 between the four main tanks. 558 00:26:36,127 --> 00:26:37,395 Number two is empty. 559 00:26:37,462 --> 00:26:39,764 NARRATOR: But it's not working. 560 00:26:39,831 --> 00:26:43,268 You're going to lose number three in a minute, too. 561 00:26:43,335 --> 00:26:46,638 NARRATOR: One by one, fuel starvation shuts down all the, 562 00:26:46,705 --> 00:26:52,444 engines leaving the DC-8 without any power. 563 00:26:52,510 --> 00:26:53,611 MALBURN MCBROOM (ON RECORDING): OK. 564 00:26:53,678 --> 00:26:59,651 Declare mayday. 565 00:26:59,718 --> 00:27:05,156 The engines didn't have any fuel. 566 00:27:05,223 --> 00:27:08,326 We knew that the aircraft ran out of fuel. 567 00:27:08,393 --> 00:27:12,197 So then became the question, why? 568 00:27:12,263 --> 00:27:15,033 Why would a modern transport aircraft 569 00:27:15,100 --> 00:27:17,535 like this run out of fuel? 570 00:27:17,602 --> 00:27:20,638 NARRATOR: Investigators focus on two possibilities-- 571 00:27:20,705 --> 00:27:25,143 mechanical failure or human error. 572 00:27:25,210 --> 00:27:28,880 Was it a crew problem, or was it an aircraft problem? 573 00:27:31,216 --> 00:27:32,717 NARRATOR: McBroom may be the only one 574 00:27:32,784 --> 00:27:36,654 who can give the answer. 575 00:27:36,721 --> 00:27:41,192 I wanted to be on final with as much fuel as I could have. 576 00:27:41,259 --> 00:27:43,328 You've got to keep them running, Frosty. 577 00:27:43,395 --> 00:27:44,763 NARRATOR: Recovering from his injuries 578 00:27:44,829 --> 00:27:47,399 in an Oregon hospital, he's now well enough 579 00:27:47,465 --> 00:27:49,567 to tell his side of the story. 580 00:27:49,634 --> 00:27:51,770 We finally sat down with Captain McBroom 581 00:27:51,836 --> 00:27:54,539 and asked the tough questions. 582 00:27:54,606 --> 00:27:57,442 JOHN COX: A pilot takes the responsibility 583 00:27:57,509 --> 00:27:59,444 for the passengers and his fellow crew members 584 00:27:59,511 --> 00:28:03,782 extremely seriously, and to be involved in an accident 585 00:28:03,848 --> 00:28:05,850 where there are fatalities is something 586 00:28:05,917 --> 00:28:09,087 that never leaves you. 587 00:28:09,154 --> 00:28:13,691 It would be with a pilot the remainder of their lives. 588 00:28:13,758 --> 00:28:17,429 I recall seeing the number one 589 00:28:17,495 --> 00:28:19,697 and number two warning lights come on, 590 00:28:19,764 --> 00:28:24,436 but I knew we had fuel. 591 00:28:24,502 --> 00:28:27,038 ALAN DIEHL: He was still convinced that somehow 592 00:28:27,105 --> 00:28:29,274 the fuel had either leaked out of the tanks, 593 00:28:29,340 --> 00:28:32,577 or the fuel burn was too high, or the gauges were wrong. 594 00:28:32,644 --> 00:28:34,379 No, it's showing 1,000 or better. 595 00:28:34,446 --> 00:28:38,550 I don't think it's in there. 596 00:28:38,616 --> 00:28:40,385 NARRATOR: Meanwhile, in Washington, 597 00:28:40,452 --> 00:28:46,224 Dennis Grossi digs deeper in search of a mechanical cause. 598 00:28:46,291 --> 00:28:49,861 He studies Flight 173's flight plan. 599 00:28:49,928 --> 00:28:52,163 He uses it to calculate the amount of fuel 600 00:28:52,230 --> 00:28:54,265 the DC-8 should have burned. 601 00:29:01,906 --> 00:29:03,141 JOHN COX: A DC-8 burns somewhere 602 00:29:03,208 --> 00:29:08,012 in the neighborhood of 13,000 pounds of fuel an hour. 603 00:29:08,079 --> 00:29:09,647 The question is, did this aircraft 604 00:29:09,714 --> 00:29:13,618 burn fuel faster than normal? 605 00:29:13,685 --> 00:29:16,354 NARRATOR: If the data shows any discrepancy, 606 00:29:16,421 --> 00:29:18,790 it could mean the captain was right. 607 00:29:21,426 --> 00:29:22,861 DENNIS GROSSI: There must have been a problem 608 00:29:22,927 --> 00:29:27,265 that the engines were burning a lot more fuel than normal 609 00:29:27,332 --> 00:29:32,537 or there was some anomaly in the aircraft. 610 00:29:32,604 --> 00:29:35,240 NARRATOR: His analysis finds no problem. 611 00:29:35,306 --> 00:29:38,309 Flight 173 took off with more than enough fuel 612 00:29:38,376 --> 00:29:40,478 to reach Portland and was consuming 613 00:29:40,545 --> 00:29:44,048 it at the standard rate. 614 00:29:44,115 --> 00:29:46,518 The fuel burn is completely normal. 615 00:29:46,584 --> 00:29:50,388 The conclusion was that the aircraft performance was 616 00:29:50,455 --> 00:29:53,892 normal and that there was no anomalies in the amount 617 00:29:53,958 --> 00:29:54,893 of fuel consumed. 618 00:29:56,961 --> 00:29:57,896 Showing films. 619 00:30:00,632 --> 00:30:01,633 NARRATOR: Investigators are left 620 00:30:01,699 --> 00:30:05,203 with a troubling question. 621 00:30:05,270 --> 00:30:09,908 How could an experienced crew lose track of how much fuel 622 00:30:09,974 --> 00:30:13,711 they had onboard and, in fact, run out of fuel when they 623 00:30:13,778 --> 00:30:17,849 were in view of the airport? 624 00:30:17,916 --> 00:30:20,418 NARRATOR: Grossi considers the possibility that the plane's 625 00:30:20,485 --> 00:30:23,021 fuel gauges malfunctioned. 626 00:30:23,087 --> 00:30:26,858 He studies the CVR transcript, focusing in on the crew's 627 00:30:26,925 --> 00:30:30,862 discussion of fuel levels. 628 00:30:30,929 --> 00:30:32,564 DENNIS GROSSI: Fuel gauges are not known 629 00:30:32,630 --> 00:30:35,366 for being all that precise. 630 00:30:35,433 --> 00:30:38,303 That's why it was so important for the performance study 631 00:30:38,369 --> 00:30:41,973 to correlate the amount of fuel that was actually 632 00:30:42,040 --> 00:30:44,976 on the aircraft with what was actually 633 00:30:45,043 --> 00:30:47,812 being indicated to the crew. 634 00:30:47,879 --> 00:30:49,781 How not sure we got, Frosty? 635 00:30:49,847 --> 00:30:52,951 NARRATOR: If the gauges weren't working properly-- 636 00:30:53,017 --> 00:30:54,085 5,000. 637 00:30:54,152 --> 00:30:55,620 NARRATOR: --it could explain why the crew let 638 00:30:55,687 --> 00:30:59,791 the fuel levels fall so low. 639 00:30:59,857 --> 00:31:01,526 The crew discuss, how much fuel do you have? 640 00:31:01,593 --> 00:31:04,295 We got 5,000 pounds. 641 00:31:04,362 --> 00:31:06,264 NARRATOR: By matching the time and the transcript 642 00:31:06,331 --> 00:31:09,500 with the fuel burn chart, Grossi 643 00:31:09,567 --> 00:31:13,338 can determine if the gauges were working accurately. 644 00:31:13,404 --> 00:31:16,241 You take the data and apply the time factor to it, 645 00:31:16,307 --> 00:31:18,710 and you can figure out how much fuel they 646 00:31:18,776 --> 00:31:21,112 should have had remaining. 647 00:31:21,179 --> 00:31:23,681 NARRATOR: He discovers the flight engineer-- 648 00:31:23,748 --> 00:31:24,682 FORREST MENDENHALL: 5,000. 649 00:31:24,749 --> 00:31:27,318 NARRATOR: --had the correct reading 650 00:31:27,385 --> 00:31:28,720 5,000. 651 00:31:28,786 --> 00:31:30,321 That's exactly right. 652 00:31:30,388 --> 00:31:33,324 There was nothing wrong with the gauges either. 653 00:31:33,391 --> 00:31:36,060 He said that they saw 5,000 pounds. 654 00:31:36,127 --> 00:31:40,965 That was consistent with what the fuel burn study showed. 655 00:31:41,032 --> 00:31:42,700 NARRATOR: Investigators are convinced 656 00:31:42,767 --> 00:31:45,236 that Flight 173's fuel system was 657 00:31:45,303 --> 00:31:49,774 working exactly as it should. 658 00:31:49,841 --> 00:31:53,778 Lights in the fuel pump. 659 00:31:53,845 --> 00:31:56,281 NARRATOR: 35 minutes after the captain put his plane 660 00:31:56,347 --> 00:31:58,449 into a holding pattern, a warning 661 00:31:58,516 --> 00:32:02,620 light tells the flight engineer that fuel is dangerously low. 662 00:32:02,687 --> 00:32:03,755 That's about right. 663 00:32:03,821 --> 00:32:06,391 The feed pumps are starting to blink. 664 00:32:06,457 --> 00:32:07,692 ALAN DIEHL: Fuel pump lights come on. 665 00:32:07,759 --> 00:32:10,161 This means that the-- they're literally sucking air. 666 00:32:10,228 --> 00:32:12,397 As the fuel sloshes around in tanks, 667 00:32:12,463 --> 00:32:15,600 this plane should have been headed for the airport soon. 668 00:32:15,667 --> 00:32:19,370 NARRATOR: But captain McBroom still isn't ready to land. 669 00:32:19,437 --> 00:32:22,140 JOHN COX: To be in an airplane with that little fuel, it's 670 00:32:22,206 --> 00:32:24,075 something that, as a pilot-- 671 00:32:24,142 --> 00:32:25,810 I've never been in that position, 672 00:32:25,877 --> 00:32:28,813 and I would be extraordinarily uncomfortable. 673 00:32:28,880 --> 00:32:31,716 NARRATOR: His reaction is puzzling. 674 00:32:31,783 --> 00:32:34,485 I figure about another 15 minutes. 675 00:32:34,552 --> 00:32:36,988 ALAN DIEHL: The flight engineer said, Captain, 15 minutes? 676 00:32:37,055 --> 00:32:39,724 That's going to run us kind of close on fuel out here. 677 00:32:39,791 --> 00:32:41,726 Not enough. 678 00:32:41,793 --> 00:32:44,195 15 minutes is really going to run us low on fuel here. 679 00:32:44,262 --> 00:32:47,332 That was his one definitive statement to the captain 680 00:32:47,398 --> 00:32:49,367 that things were not right. 681 00:32:49,434 --> 00:32:51,336 NARRATOR: The captain wants more time to prepare 682 00:32:51,402 --> 00:32:53,137 for the emergency landing. 683 00:32:53,204 --> 00:32:54,839 Call around. 684 00:32:54,906 --> 00:32:57,408 Give them our passenger count and them him to give 685 00:32:57,475 --> 00:33:01,713 that to the fire department. 686 00:33:01,779 --> 00:33:07,018 NARRATOR: Instead of heading straight for the runway, 687 00:33:07,085 --> 00:33:11,823 he turns the plane into one last circle over Portland. 688 00:33:11,889 --> 00:33:14,258 I kept thinking, why isn't this guy 689 00:33:14,325 --> 00:33:17,495 turning in to the airport at this time? 690 00:33:17,562 --> 00:33:19,464 NARRATOR: The plane has been in a holding pattern 691 00:33:19,530 --> 00:33:21,532 for more than 40 minutes. 692 00:33:21,599 --> 00:33:24,769 It will take at least 15 more to land, 693 00:33:24,836 --> 00:33:31,676 but the aircraft has only 14 minutes worth of fuel. 694 00:33:32,677 --> 00:33:36,280 A crash landing is now inevitable. 695 00:33:36,347 --> 00:33:37,281 Engines are flaming out. 696 00:33:37,348 --> 00:33:38,583 We're going down. 697 00:33:38,649 --> 00:33:41,753 We're not going to be able to make it to the airport. 698 00:33:41,819 --> 00:33:43,254 NARRATOR: Investigators now know 699 00:33:43,321 --> 00:33:45,656 that Captain McBroom received clear warnings 700 00:33:45,723 --> 00:33:49,527 about low fuel levels. 701 00:33:49,594 --> 00:33:51,662 This didn't have to happen. 702 00:33:51,729 --> 00:33:53,631 NARRATOR: What they don't understand 703 00:33:53,698 --> 00:33:56,901 Is why he ignored them. 704 00:33:56,968 --> 00:33:58,503 ALAN DIEHL: And this was not an act of God. 705 00:33:58,569 --> 00:34:00,972 This was not a massive mechanical failure. 706 00:34:01,038 --> 00:34:04,442 This was an airplane that was perfectly flyable, good night, 707 00:34:04,509 --> 00:34:07,078 within sight of the airport. 708 00:34:07,145 --> 00:34:10,214 This accident should never have happened. 709 00:34:10,281 --> 00:34:12,083 RODERICK BEEBE (ON RECORDING): How much fuel we got now? 710 00:34:12,150 --> 00:34:15,720 NARRATOR: The NTSB's Al Diehl returns to the CVR looking 711 00:34:15,787 --> 00:34:18,189 for anything that might shed some light on the captain's 712 00:34:18,256 --> 00:34:19,424 state of mind. 713 00:34:19,490 --> 00:34:23,594 When you listen to the tapes over and over again, 714 00:34:23,661 --> 00:34:25,997 you can detect things like voice inflections, 715 00:34:26,063 --> 00:34:29,967 subtle voice mannerisms that are trying to communicate 716 00:34:30,034 --> 00:34:32,437 to other members of the crew. 717 00:34:32,503 --> 00:34:35,339 NARRATOR: Diehl is struck by an unusual aspect of McBroom's 718 00:34:35,406 --> 00:34:37,575 behavior in the cockpit. 719 00:34:37,642 --> 00:34:39,076 RODERICK BEEBE (ON RECORDING): How much fuel we got now? 720 00:34:40,445 --> 00:34:42,013 NARRATOR: His crewmates tried more than once to alert 721 00:34:42,079 --> 00:34:46,584 him to the fuel situation. 722 00:34:46,651 --> 00:34:48,085 How much fuel we've got now? 723 00:34:48,152 --> 00:34:54,125 4-- 4,000, in each, pounds. 724 00:34:54,192 --> 00:34:57,261 Both the first officer and the second officer 725 00:34:57,328 --> 00:35:00,431 were acutely aware of the fuel status. 726 00:35:00,498 --> 00:35:01,933 NARRATOR: But McBroom is focusing 727 00:35:01,999 --> 00:35:05,269 on the broken landing gear. 728 00:35:05,336 --> 00:35:10,107 There's-- there's one check we missed, checking 729 00:35:10,174 --> 00:35:14,378 the gear whirring horn. 730 00:35:14,445 --> 00:35:15,379 Right. 731 00:35:15,446 --> 00:35:16,380 Correct. 732 00:35:16,447 --> 00:35:17,582 Right. 733 00:35:17,648 --> 00:35:20,084 So how do we do that? 734 00:35:20,151 --> 00:35:22,320 JOHN COX: Flying with a very senior captain, it 735 00:35:22,386 --> 00:35:24,021 would be very difficult to-- 736 00:35:24,088 --> 00:35:27,492 to challenge that Captain in those days about something 737 00:35:27,558 --> 00:35:28,493 like fuel. 738 00:35:28,559 --> 00:35:29,627 ALAN DIEHL: The other crew members 739 00:35:29,694 --> 00:35:31,062 are trying to get this captain's attention, 740 00:35:31,128 --> 00:35:34,332 but he was apparently totally focused on the gear problem 741 00:35:34,398 --> 00:35:37,201 to the exclusion of all else. 742 00:35:37,268 --> 00:35:40,238 NARRATOR: Even after the engines begin to flame out, 743 00:35:40,304 --> 00:35:42,473 McBroom is still trying to fix the malfunctioning 744 00:35:42,540 --> 00:35:43,474 landing gear. 745 00:35:46,511 --> 00:35:47,945 McBroom was not going to give up. 746 00:35:51,349 --> 00:35:54,452 He was going to find a-- what we sometimes called 747 00:35:54,519 --> 00:35:56,721 the golden BB, the one thing that would answer 748 00:35:56,787 --> 00:35:59,257 the riddle as to why this light is not on, 749 00:35:59,323 --> 00:36:02,593 and of course that never happened. 750 00:36:02,660 --> 00:36:04,295 NARRATOR: McBroom is determined to fix 751 00:36:04,362 --> 00:36:08,299 a mechanical problem that could threaten the plane's safety. 752 00:36:08,366 --> 00:36:11,035 On the touchdown, if that gear folds or something-- 753 00:36:11,102 --> 00:36:12,937 NARRATOR: As a result, he misses a far 754 00:36:13,004 --> 00:36:14,972 bigger and deadlier threat. 755 00:36:15,039 --> 00:36:19,076 The gear problem is really a distraction for the crew. 756 00:36:19,143 --> 00:36:23,748 You had a small problem with a small potential consequence, 757 00:36:23,814 --> 00:36:26,417 the gear collapsing on landing. 758 00:36:26,484 --> 00:36:27,952 But the captain was so focused on 759 00:36:28,019 --> 00:36:30,054 that he lost the big picture. 760 00:36:30,121 --> 00:36:32,423 Reset that circuit breaker momentarily. 761 00:36:32,490 --> 00:36:33,925 See if we get gear lights. 762 00:36:33,991 --> 00:36:36,527 DENNIS GROSSI: They lost sight of the real emergency, 763 00:36:36,594 --> 00:36:39,297 which was the lack of fuel. 764 00:36:39,363 --> 00:36:41,098 NARRATOR: Al Diehl now understands 765 00:36:41,165 --> 00:36:44,101 how Captain McBroom's obsession with the malfunctioning 766 00:36:44,168 --> 00:36:47,104 landing gear led to disaster. 767 00:36:47,171 --> 00:36:50,374 JOHN COX: After this accident, the National Transportation 768 00:36:50,441 --> 00:36:52,410 Safety Board said flight crew members need 769 00:36:52,476 --> 00:36:55,846 to be better trained to communicate when they 770 00:36:55,913 --> 00:36:59,016 have safety of flight issues. 771 00:36:59,083 --> 00:37:01,586 NARRATOR: What happened aboard Flight 173 772 00:37:01,652 --> 00:37:06,691 is, alarmingly, not an isolated case. 773 00:37:09,727 --> 00:37:15,232 Just a year earlier, another DC-8 crashed in almost 774 00:37:15,299 --> 00:37:18,803 identical circumstances. 775 00:37:18,869 --> 00:37:21,906 ALAN DIEHL: It was a United crew, same kind of aircraft, 776 00:37:21,973 --> 00:37:24,442 gear unsafe light, entered a holding pattern at night, 777 00:37:24,508 --> 00:37:27,678 flew around, troubleshooting the gear problem. 778 00:37:27,745 --> 00:37:30,681 They flew into a mountain and killed everybody aboard. 779 00:37:33,050 --> 00:37:35,186 NARRATOR: It was one of a string of deadly crashes 780 00:37:35,252 --> 00:37:39,957 during the 1970s involving a lack of communication. 781 00:37:40,024 --> 00:37:41,993 The list includes Eastern Airlines 782 00:37:42,059 --> 00:37:47,698 Flight 401, a Lockheed L-1011 bound for Miami. 783 00:37:47,765 --> 00:37:50,534 Here, too, they had a gear unsafe light. 784 00:37:53,938 --> 00:37:56,474 They ended up descending into the Everglades, crashing, 785 00:37:56,540 --> 00:37:58,709 and killed over 100 people. 786 00:38:05,116 --> 00:38:06,550 NARRATOR: The deadliest air disaster 787 00:38:06,617 --> 00:38:10,321 in history at Tenerife in the Canary Islands. 788 00:38:10,388 --> 00:38:17,061 It was caused by poor communication. 789 00:38:17,128 --> 00:38:20,498 The collision claimed 583 lives. 790 00:38:20,564 --> 00:38:21,799 ALAN DIEHL: There was a pattern here 791 00:38:21,866 --> 00:38:24,368 where we're having the same types of accidents where 792 00:38:24,435 --> 00:38:28,105 other flight deck crewmembers were having a difficult time 793 00:38:28,172 --> 00:38:30,474 getting the captain's attention and making 794 00:38:30,541 --> 00:38:31,509 him do the right thing. 795 00:38:36,047 --> 00:38:38,516 NARRATOR: Al Diehl is convinced that the way pilots 796 00:38:38,582 --> 00:38:41,052 communicate with each other is now a growing 797 00:38:41,118 --> 00:38:43,454 threat to commercial aviation. 798 00:38:43,521 --> 00:38:45,489 A lot of people at NTSB elsewhere 799 00:38:45,556 --> 00:38:47,692 thought we were going to be headed for a bloodbath 800 00:38:47,758 --> 00:38:51,262 if we didn't get a handle on the causes of human error. 801 00:38:59,470 --> 00:39:02,206 Diehl learns about an experimental pilot training 802 00:39:02,273 --> 00:39:05,443 program developed by NASA that could help 803 00:39:05,509 --> 00:39:10,214 solve the growing problem. 804 00:39:10,281 --> 00:39:13,851 Known as Cockpit Resource Management or CRM, 805 00:39:13,918 --> 00:39:16,187 it's a system of training designed to improve 806 00:39:16,253 --> 00:39:19,256 the way pilots communicate. 807 00:39:19,323 --> 00:39:22,226 It helps to improve crew coordination 808 00:39:22,293 --> 00:39:24,562 and improve collective decision-making 809 00:39:24,628 --> 00:39:25,963 on the cockpit. 810 00:39:26,030 --> 00:39:28,733 And the way it does that is it teaches captains to listen 811 00:39:28,799 --> 00:39:30,801 better, and it teaches the other members 812 00:39:30,868 --> 00:39:34,605 of the flight deck to be respectfully assertive. 813 00:39:34,672 --> 00:39:35,740 NARRATOR: In a move that will have 814 00:39:35,806 --> 00:39:38,642 a lasting impact on airline safety, 815 00:39:38,709 --> 00:39:43,013 the FAA adopts deals CRM recommendation. 816 00:39:44,348 --> 00:39:47,952 From here on, the job of flying a commercial airliner 817 00:39:48,018 --> 00:39:52,523 will never be the same. 818 00:39:56,427 --> 00:39:58,229 United Airlines is one of the first 819 00:39:58,295 --> 00:40:02,266 to implement a CRM training program for its pilots. 820 00:40:02,333 --> 00:40:06,771 It's still in use today. 821 00:40:06,837 --> 00:40:09,240 United's director of flight training operations 822 00:40:09,306 --> 00:40:11,442 is Marc Champion. 823 00:40:11,509 --> 00:40:13,911 The principles of Crew Resource Management 824 00:40:13,978 --> 00:40:17,148 are that no one individual in the cockpit 825 00:40:17,214 --> 00:40:21,018 can possibly understand or see all of the threats 826 00:40:21,085 --> 00:40:22,386 that are out there. 827 00:40:22,453 --> 00:40:26,056 It requires the entire crew to really foresee and manage 828 00:40:26,123 --> 00:40:29,160 the various threats that happen to be in play 829 00:40:29,226 --> 00:40:31,128 when an airplane is in flight. 830 00:40:31,195 --> 00:40:33,430 NARRATOR: Today, United pilot Sheri Rutledge-- 831 00:40:33,497 --> 00:40:36,433 Also I'm having a hard time maintaining my speed here. 832 00:40:36,500 --> 00:40:37,535 --is undergoing CRM training. 833 00:40:37,601 --> 00:40:38,803 Let me talk to the flight attendant. 834 00:40:38,869 --> 00:40:40,204 You continue to steer the airplane. 835 00:40:40,271 --> 00:40:41,338 DENNIS GROSSI: I got the airplane. 836 00:40:42,673 --> 00:40:44,108 NARRATOR: In this simulation, she and her captain 837 00:40:44,175 --> 00:40:45,209 are dealing with an emergency. 838 00:40:46,310 --> 00:40:47,745 Engine oil low pressure. 839 00:40:47,812 --> 00:40:51,115 If oil is less than 60 PSI-- 840 00:40:51,182 --> 00:40:53,284 NARRATOR: A mechanical problem has forced a shutdown 841 00:40:53,350 --> 00:40:55,085 of one of their two engines. - --level one to idle. 842 00:40:55,152 --> 00:40:56,420 Confirm to us. 843 00:40:56,487 --> 00:40:59,056 Engine one shut down, engine mode selector to ignition. 844 00:40:59,123 --> 00:41:04,528 It's designed to mimic the situations that I will 845 00:41:04,595 --> 00:41:06,664 see in actual airplane flying. 846 00:41:06,730 --> 00:41:08,899 Yes. 847 00:41:08,966 --> 00:41:13,337 Oakland Center, United 1916, we're declaring an emergency. 848 00:41:13,404 --> 00:41:15,606 We've had an engine failure at altitude. 849 00:41:15,673 --> 00:41:17,875 There are specific threats that we 850 00:41:17,942 --> 00:41:21,111 have to deal with as a crew, be able to communicate, 851 00:41:21,178 --> 00:41:24,882 plan, decision-make through to a safe outcome. 852 00:41:24,949 --> 00:41:27,952 So it's a problem-solving type of scenario, 853 00:41:28,018 --> 00:41:29,119 and you're very focused. 854 00:41:29,186 --> 00:41:30,821 It doesn't look to me as though we've got a fire 855 00:41:30,888 --> 00:41:32,022 issue, though. 856 00:41:32,089 --> 00:41:33,457 We've shut it down quickly enough. 857 00:41:33,524 --> 00:41:35,893 All the flight crew comes together, agrees on, 858 00:41:35,960 --> 00:41:37,328 yes, this is the way-- 859 00:41:37,394 --> 00:41:40,164 everything's appropriate, and then you go to the next step. 860 00:41:40,231 --> 00:41:41,198 Yeah, pull the book out. 861 00:41:41,265 --> 00:41:42,199 Let's take a look at that. 862 00:41:42,266 --> 00:41:44,635 OK. 863 00:41:44,702 --> 00:41:49,006 It's very easy sometimes to know what your intention is 864 00:41:49,073 --> 00:41:52,443 and think that the people around you 865 00:41:52,509 --> 00:41:55,713 will also know what that intention is. 866 00:41:55,779 --> 00:41:57,848 But that's not usually the case. 867 00:41:57,915 --> 00:41:59,917 I'm going to go off and talk to dispatch to maintain 868 00:41:59,984 --> 00:42:00,918 flying the airplane. 869 00:42:00,985 --> 00:42:02,519 How are we doing on altitude? 870 00:42:02,586 --> 00:42:04,521 NARRATOR: They keep each other informed every 871 00:42:04,588 --> 00:42:07,324 step of the way, exactly as the exercise intends. 872 00:42:07,391 --> 00:42:08,325 --San Jose as well. 873 00:42:08,392 --> 00:42:09,493 I wanted to-- 874 00:42:09,560 --> 00:42:10,961 Ladies and gentlemen, your captain speaking. 875 00:42:11,028 --> 00:42:13,631 We're now in our descent into San Francisco 876 00:42:13,697 --> 00:42:20,204 this ERM training makes every difference in every flight. 877 00:42:20,271 --> 00:42:23,107 It has empowered me as a crew member 878 00:42:23,173 --> 00:42:25,976 and reminded me to speak up. 879 00:42:26,043 --> 00:42:28,379 We're getting a little close in here. 880 00:42:28,445 --> 00:42:31,148 To help with decisions, to maintain 881 00:42:31,215 --> 00:42:33,317 my situational awareness, and that, I think, 882 00:42:33,384 --> 00:42:36,820 is the most important part of it. 883 00:42:36,887 --> 00:42:39,256 ALAN DIEHL: In the States, we've literally gone a decade 884 00:42:39,323 --> 00:42:41,926 without losing a single passenger 885 00:42:41,992 --> 00:42:44,628 at a major carrier accident. 886 00:42:47,898 --> 00:42:50,601 Many of the experts have concluded that that was 887 00:42:50,668 --> 00:42:52,870 at least partly due to CRM. 888 00:42:54,071 --> 00:42:55,940 NARRATOR: Had the crew of Flight 173 889 00:42:56,006 --> 00:42:58,042 received such training-- 890 00:42:58,108 --> 00:43:00,277 I figure about another 15 minutes. 891 00:43:00,344 --> 00:43:02,012 NARRATOR: --they might have expressed their concerns 892 00:43:02,079 --> 00:43:04,014 more forcefully, insisting Captain 893 00:43:04,081 --> 00:43:05,549 McBroom land immediately. 894 00:43:05,616 --> 00:43:07,484 Not enough. 895 00:43:07,551 --> 00:43:10,154 15 minutes is really going to run us low on fuel here. 896 00:43:10,220 --> 00:43:12,323 Instead, they expected their captain 897 00:43:12,389 --> 00:43:17,261 to make the right decision. 898 00:43:17,328 --> 00:43:19,530 OK, declare mayday. 899 00:43:20,597 --> 00:43:21,899 NARRATOR: Melburn McBroom was held 900 00:43:21,966 --> 00:43:24,668 responsible for the crash. 901 00:43:24,735 --> 00:43:31,141 He retired shortly afterwards. 902 00:43:31,208 --> 00:43:33,510 Flight 173 passenger Aimee Connor 903 00:43:33,577 --> 00:43:40,217 met Captain McBroom in 1998, six years before his death. 904 00:43:41,218 --> 00:43:42,553 The man that I saw at the reunion 905 00:43:42,619 --> 00:43:47,791 was very broken, very broken, and yet so willing 906 00:43:47,858 --> 00:43:52,096 to be there for us under whatever 907 00:43:52,162 --> 00:43:55,799 circumstances there were. 908 00:43:55,866 --> 00:43:56,800 MALBURN MCBROOM: Call around. 909 00:43:56,867 --> 00:43:58,502 Give them a passenger count. 910 00:43:58,569 --> 00:44:00,571 AIMEE CONNER: If I had had any anger toward him 911 00:44:00,637 --> 00:44:04,842 before the reunion, I sure didn't after I met him, 912 00:44:04,908 --> 00:44:07,077 I know that he truly believed he had more 913 00:44:07,144 --> 00:44:08,912 fuel onboard than he did have. 914 00:44:08,979 --> 00:44:10,180 MALBURN MCBROOM: Tell him to pass that 915 00:44:10,247 --> 00:44:12,816 on to the fire department. 916 00:44:12,883 --> 00:44:16,754 I always said that pilot air is not an answer. 917 00:44:16,820 --> 00:44:19,223 It's only a symptom of some underlying problems. 918 00:44:19,289 --> 00:44:21,725 MALBURN MCBROOM: The thing to remember is, don't worry. 919 00:44:21,792 --> 00:44:24,795 ALAN DIEHL: McBroom was flying under the cockpit 920 00:44:24,862 --> 00:44:26,096 culture of the time. 921 00:44:26,163 --> 00:44:28,799 This was an accident waiting to happen. 922 00:44:28,866 --> 00:44:30,501 They were a product of their times, 923 00:44:30,567 --> 00:44:34,004 and we have to judge those men by the environment 924 00:44:34,071 --> 00:44:37,041 they operated in. 925 00:44:37,107 --> 00:44:40,077 You don't do that sort of thing on purpose. 926 00:44:40,144 --> 00:44:41,712 We can't make it. 927 00:44:41,779 --> 00:44:44,915 He was devastated. 928 00:44:44,982 --> 00:44:46,650 He lost his license. 929 00:44:46,717 --> 00:44:49,153 He lost his family. 930 00:44:49,219 --> 00:44:52,423 The rest of his life was just shattered.